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Absential Locations and the Figureless Ground 
Clare Mac Cumhaill 
 
When Sartre arrives late to meet Pierre at a local establishment, he discovers not merely that Pierre is 
absent, but Pierre’s absence, where this depends, or so Sartre notoriously supposes, on a frustrated 
expectation that Pierre would be seen at that place. Many philosophers have railed against this view, 
taking it to entail a treatment of the ontology of absence that Richard Gale describes as ‘attitudinal’ 
– one whereby absences are thought to ontologically depend on psychological attitudes.i In this 
paper, I aim to make Sartre’s intuition respectable. What Sartre perceives is an absential location, only 
the boundaries of which are circumscribed by what Sartre is doing at that place: meeting Pierre. I 
explain how this Sartrean view, though not specifically attributable to Sartre, nonetheless honours 
some of the phenomenological data described, if a little opaquely, in Being and Nothingness.   
Keywords: absence perception, nothingness, individuation, boundaries. 
 
 
The character of perceptual experience is elusive, at least insofar as it is hard to put into 
words what it’s like. This being so, many theorists resort to quotation. The character of perceptual 
experience is ‘what it’s like’ for some perceiver to be undergoing experience at a time, whatever that 
way of being ‘like’ is. The thought is that one should intuitively know. Suppose then that one does 
know – that the idiom succeeds in capturing something. And suppose too, as many do, that absences 
can be perceived - Pierre at the Café, for instance. We might then wonder: Can there be ‘something 
it’s like’ to perceive absences? Emboldened by philosophical theory, the answer might seem plain: 
‘no’. If ‘what it’s like’ is explained by adverting to the sensible properties represented in, or presented 
by experience, then the possibility of their being ‘something it’s like’ to perceive absence seems 
foreclosed. If absences lack sensible properties, there isn’t anything it’s like. But how then can our 
awarenesss of them be genuinely perceptual?  
To reify this puzzle, suppose, like many theorists do, that experience is ‘transparent’ or 
‘diaphanous’. This idiom is sometimes harnessed to undermine the thought that experiences, qua 
experiences, have intrinsic properties or qualities all of their own – peculiarly experiential qualities. 
The thought is that, in attempting to discover by introspection the presence of such qualities, one 
only ever manages to ‘see through’ the experience to the worldly things and features that one’s 
experience is of. As such, the idiom of transparency is only metaphorical. In saying that the 
experience is ‘transparent’ it is not implied that there is some phenomenal individual that one in fact 
‘sees through’ in the way that one sees through a chiffon garment say, at least in the visual case. 
Rather the fact that the introspecting perceiver finds nothing manifestly experiential to alight upon 
suggests just the reverse. In apparent cases of absence perception, then, this is a happy conclusion. 
For consider, were experience ‘seen through’ in a non-metaphorical sense - that is, were it the case 
that the mind-independent world is only mediately seen – then what kind of sensory ‘stand in’ could 
lead one to ‘see through’ the experience in a non-metaphorical sense to absence?  
Suppose, then, it is assumed both that experiences are only metaphorically transparent and 
transparent, moreover, without remainder – that is to say, on introspection one finds only mind-
independent properties and features.ii And suppose too that absences can be perceived. These 
assumptions, in tandem, spark a puzzle: There being no sensible properties for introspection to alight 
upon when absences are putatively perceived, can it be granted that there is, after all, ‘something it’s 
like’ to perceive absence?  
I address this question by way of rehabilitating an oft-maligned Sartrean take on perceiving 
absence. I suggest that there is ‘something it’s like’ to perceive the absence of something at some 
place – one sees a figureless ground - but that making sense of ‘what it’s like’ requires appeal to 
configurational features of the phenomenology of agentive perceptual experience. Accordingly, I 
argue that we should deny that experience is transparent without remainder. To begin, I draw on 
C.B. Martin’s ontology of absence so as to generate some terminology that makes talk of 
nothingness more tractable. I set out the plan for the paper at the end of §1. 
 
§1.  Absences and Absential Locations 
 
For C.B. Martin (2006), we should avoid any kind of reification of absences - absences or lacks or 
holes are not things. Still, we should not de-ontologise absences entirely. Consider some old-
fashioned presences: pencils, boots and bicycles. The provision of the limits of the being of such 
presences requires, says Martin, the presence of absence outwith those limits – the presence of 
absence at places where those things are not.iii  
Prima facie, it might be thought that part of Martin’s motivation for denying, to absences, 
the status of thinghood is their lacking sensible properties. But Martin has something else in mind. 
Absences are spatiotemporal states - they are ways the world is at a particular locale, or more precisely, 
the way natural properties and relations are. On Martin’s picture then, absences do have properties. 
Take a particular arctic snowdrift. By Martin’s lights, the way the world is at the place at which the 
snowdrift is is such that penguins are absent at that place, where the absence of penguins at that 
place is constituted by snowy and drifty properties instantiated at that locale.  As a preliminary, I 
sketch a distinct position, one that is broadly compatible with Martin’s insight but which makes 
room for the intuitive thought that absences lack sensible properties and so cannot be supposed to 
ground there being ‘anything it’s like’ to perceive them.  
We often say of things and people that they ‘are absent’, ‘gone’ or ‘missing’: children, 
biscuits, screws. Such predications of absence are predications of an absentee, where the application 
of the predicatival complement to the grammatical subject (which picks out the absentee) is typically 
evaluated relative to a place. Call places at which the application of the predicate is evaluated as true 
absential locations.iv My proposal is that while the truth of an evaluation relative to a place is 
determined by the way the world is at that place, the boundaries of the region evaluated are 
determined by reference to the interests and intentions of the evaluator. As I show, this helps make 
compelling a rehabilitation of a peculiarly Sartrean take on absence perception, if not one that can be 
attributed in whole to Sartre. Sorensen complains of Sartre “who made human beings the arbiters of 
nonbeing?”.v My project is not to absolve Sartre. Rather, I aim to show that we can excavate from 
Being and Nothingness the descriptive phenomenological resources that help frame a decidedly Sartrean 
account of absence perception which is itself absent in the literature, and which, as I see it, deserves 
consideration. Importantly, the Sartrean view that I sketch does not treat the ontology of absence as 
attitudinal – absences are not ontologically dependent on psychological attitudes. This is since 
predication of ‘absence’ of an absentee can be true or false when evaluated relative to a place. 
Nonetheless, attitudes are involved. They are involved to the extent that they set the boundaries of the 
region so evaluated, in a sense to be made plain. And, as I explain too, they are also relevant to an 
explanation of ‘what it is like’ to apprehend absence at a place, or, better, an absential location. In 
line with Sartre’s oblique phenomenology in Being and Nothingness, I suggest that, in apprehending an 
absential location, one can be said to see a figureless ground, even where that ground is plentitudinuous 
(in ways also to made clear). But if this is right, experience is not transparent without remainder: 
experience is configured in a certain way.vi The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: In §2, I 
outline Brian O’Shaughnessy’s treatment of absence perception and I introduce the Sartrean 
alternative that I want to develop. In §3, I provide some descriptive phenomenology, garnered from 
Being and Nothingness, as a way of illustrating this alternative and I note the role that perceptual 
activity plays in partly grounding that phenomenology. In §4, I show how this treatment makes 
Sartre’s position more respectable, and even, as I hope, compelling, by applying the proposal to a 
particular case.  
 
 
§2.  Negation and Nothingness  
 
Sartre is late.  
 
“I look at the room, the patrons, and I say, “He is not here”. Is there an 
intuition of Pierre’s absence, or does negation indeed enter in only with 
judgment? At first sight it seems absurd to speak here of intuition since to be 
exact there could not be an intuition of nothing and since the absence of Pierre 
is this nothing. Popular consciousness, however, bears witness to this intuition. 
Do we not say, for example, “I suddenly saw that he was not there”. Is this 
just a matter of misplacing (déplacement) the negation?”vii 
 
I return to this enigmatic question below. Before that, consider a recent treatment of this 
dilemma.  
In Consciousness and the World, O’Shaughnessy (2000) insists that perception is only ever of 
positivities, of things that have, in his terminology, ‘phenomenal reality’ or phenomenal appearance.viii 
For example, darkness, though a privation, has an appearance – it is black or close enough depending 
on the time of day. Moreover, that darkness appears that way is contingent; it could have had some 
other appearance. Silence, in contrast, while also a privation, lacks phenomenal reality – silence could 
not have sounded any other way. Hence, while darkness is perceived, one only ever ‘perceives’ that it is 
silent, the ‘that’ here denoting the fact that a cognitive attitude also obtains. O’Shaughnessy’s treatment 
of silence ‘perception’, then, is attitudinal. Importantly, it involves conceptual content of a rather 
sophisticated sort. One is said to ‘hear’ that ‘no sound is heard’, where this cognitive state is occasioned 
by one’s introspective awareness of a failure to experience anything auditorily, a failure which one knows to 
be a veridical perceptual reading. The content of such an attitude hence involves formal conceptual 
content – negation – figuring in the content. Still, it is not the case that a failure to experience any 
phenomenal realities at a time is, for O’Shaughnessy, a requirement on ‘perceiving’ absence. Take a 
different parade case - an unsigned letter. When one ‘perceives’ the absence of a signature, says 
O’Shaughnessy, it is not the case that one introspects the failure to see anything. Rather, one sees a 
blank, white expanse – the unwritten paper. And it is the perceiving of this expanse that occasions the 
‘perceiving’ that a signature is absent. Here what the quotation marks enclose becomes paramount: 
Though ‘perceiving’ that is attitudinal insofar as it involves a cognitive attitude, it nonetheless involves, 
not the introspection of the absence of perceptual experience, but the perception of the presence of 
those phenomenal realities that occasion, or cause, the attitude to be entertained. As he explains:  
 
“That is, the experience of absence is consequent upon the seeing of white in 
the context of an expectation of seeing a name….the visual experience causes 
the experience of absence, which is in addition directly given as arising out of 
the visual experience. The experience of seeing the absence of X is the 
experience of coming-to-know-of-the-absence-of-X-(directly given as arising 
out of a present visual experience of what shows no x).” (ibid.) 
 
This parenthesis requires some gloss.  
Visual experience is of a letter that shows no X because no X is there – the letter is unsigned, 
and this is a matter of how the world is in Martin’s sense. But visual experience is not of there being 
no X for there being no X is not the kind of thing that visual experience can, for O’Shaughnessy, show. 
To be clear then, O’Shaughnessy grants the existence or presence, in the world, of absences (in an 
unreconstructed sense – he does not sort among absentees and absential locations). What he denies, 
however, is that we intuit those absences, at least so long as those absences lack phenomenal reality.  
Return to Sartre’s enigma above, and in particular the leading question that rounds the passage 
off.  Sartre supposes that our ways of talking suggest that we can intuit absence and he asks whether 
in such cases what is involved is a (mis)placing or moving (déplacement) of negation from one place to 
another. This may be understood in the following sense (which, note, may or not be Sartre’s): It may 
be asked whether popular consciousness puts negation or nothingness into the world where it rightly 
belongs only in a judgment.ix That is, does popular consciousness take it that we perceive no thing in the 
world, when in fact the relevant apprehension is cognitive and involves negation in the content? To begin 
addressing this question, it is illustrative to isolate the comparative commitments of O’Shaughnessy’s 
account.  
O’Shaughnessy maintains that only thoughts can agree or disagree with reality.x Hence, 
negation can only be located in the context of a thought. Even so, he grants the reality of absences or, 
to use Sartre’s term, nothingnesses at places. What he denies, however, and what Sartre propounds, is 
that absences are intuitable or perceivable. So where do our theorists diverge? 
For O’Shaughnessy, perception is only of positivities, of phenomenal realities. Sartre, however, 
emphasizes a distinct feature of perceptual experience. In perception, he writes, “there is always the 
construction of a figure on a ground”xi, where, notably, the ground is seen “in addition” to the figure.xii 
But, critically, this also marks perception out from thought. Thoughts lack such a figure-ground 
configuration. In thought there is nothing apprehended, or more appropriately grasped, in addition to 
the content thought. There is nothing against which that content, grasped as a whole, stands out.xiii This 
insight suggests the resources for beginning to account for the perceptual nature of absence perception 
along Sartrean lines. I suggest that Sartre’s position may be read as follows:  
In absence perception, one intuits only the ground, which may well be plenitudinous  – indeed Sartre 
lists mirrors, patrons, as well as rattling saucers as filling the café qua ground. But since one intuits only 
the ground and no figure, it might thereby be supposed that one intuits the absence of something at that place. 
Importantly, on this Sartrean position, the intuition is perceptual because of its configuration – one 
perceives that which is in addition to the figure – viz. the ground - without perceiving that which it is 
in addition to – the figure or in Sartre’s case Pierre. But this makes sense too of the explanatory relation 
that Sartre likewise affirms between absence-perception and negative judgment. The former 
conditions and supports (conditionné et soutenu) the latter. Hence, like O’Shaughnessy, the judgment is 
understood to be occasioned by perception, albeit this time the perception is understood to be not 
merely of phenomenal realities, but of phenomenal realities that are apprehended as configured in a 
certain way. And they are configured in that way, as I explain, because of what Sartre is doing at that 
place: he is there to meet Pierre. That Sartre is there to meet Pierre explains why he is looking for him 
at that place, where Sartre’s looking for him at that place contributes, as I urge below, to what it is like 




§3.  The figureless ground 
 
In a number of notorious passages in Being and Nothingness, Sartre’s descriptive phenomenology 
exploits the Gestalt idiom of figure and ground: 
 
“When I enter this café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic organization 
of all the objects in the café, on the ground of which Pierre is given as about to 
appear. This organization of the café as the ground is an original nihilation. Each 
element of the setting, a person, a table, a chair, attempts to isolate itself, to lift itself 
upon the ground constituted by the totality of other objects, only to fall back once 
more into the undifferentiation of this ground; it melts into the ground. For the 
ground is that which is seen only in addition, that which is the object of a purely 
marginal attention”xiv  
 
So what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness, it is the nothingness of 
the ground, the nihilation of which summons and demands the appearance of the 
figure, and it is the figure – the nothingness which slips as a nothing to the surface of 
the ground.” (ibid.)xv 
 
Here the entire café is apprehended merely as a ground since no figure, in this case Pierre, is 
apprehended as ‘standing out’ in addition to the ground, which is thereby an object of “purely marginal 
attention”. This explains in what sense the ground is conceived as ‘nihilated’. It is conceived as 
‘nihilated’ since its figure, Pierre, is wanting. The idiom of nihilation recalls O’Shaughnessy. 
O’Shaughnessy urges that when we see the white expanse of the writing paper, we experience the 
visual object as a presence endowed with a negative property, where this endowment flows from the 
co-obtaining of a mental attitude with negation featuring in the content. For Sartre, however – at least 
as I choose to read him - although perception may occasion negative judgment – an evaluation relative 
to a place - what imbues the ground with nothingness or negativity is its seeming failure to present a 
figure whose appearance at that place would otherwise have explained what Sartre is doing there: he is at 
the café in order to meet Pierre.  
The role that perceptual activity plays in determining the phenomenology can now be spelled 
out. The bounds of the region at which Pierre is found to be absent are circumscribed attitudinally – 
Sartre intended to meet Pierre at the café. Further, that Sartre’s looking for Pierre at the café - that is, his 
perceptual activity there - partly determines the character of his experience. In particular, all other 
potential figures for Sartre’s attention ‘melt’ into the ground: 
 
 “I am witness to the successive disappearance of all the objects which I look at – in 
particular of all the faces, which detain me for an instant (Could this be Pierre?), and 
which as quickly decompose precisely because they “are not” the face of Pierre” (ibid.)   
 
The character of Sartre’s experience then - the ‘decompositional’ quality that attends his 
experience as he searches for Pierre – is explained by Sartre’s perceptual activity in that place (the 
place where he intended to meet Pierre).  But since all the sub-regions of the café are so apprehended, 
their teeming positivity notwithstanding (patrons and rattling saucers), the entire café is apprehended in 
the same way, as housing or presenting “not” Pierre. As Sartre emphasizes: 
 
“This does not mean that I discover his absence in some precise spot in the establishment. In 
fact Pierre is absent from the whole café; his absence fixes the café in its evanescence; the café 
remains ground; it persists in offering itself as a undifferentiated totality to my only marginal 
attention…” (ibid.) 
  
 I spell this thought out in a little more detail. 
 That perceptual activity can contribute to phenomenal character is argued by Crowther 
(2010). He offers a datum for consideration. ‘What it’s like’ for a perceiver to visually attend to the 
colour of a piece clay over an interval of time is distinct from what it would be like for that same 
perceiver to attend instead to its shape. The same datum holds of perceptual activities that aim towards 
some goal: 
 
“To look for something is to scan one’s visual field with the aim noticing or finding 
out where something is. The aims with which such activities take place involve their 
own contribution to determining phenomenal character. What it is like for a viewer to 
perceptually look over the clutter around him on his desk for his memory stick is 
different from what it is like for the same viewer to merely look over just the same 
pattern of clutter around him on the desk without such an aim. But this difference 
does not seem to be manifested, necessarily, in what objects and properties are present 
to him, nor in how the various items scattered around him on the desk are represented 
as being, in having those experiences”xvi 
 
Taking Sartre’s ‘decompositional’ phenomenology seriously, one aspect of the relevant 
difference gestured at above might now be advanced:  Aimless looking involves an openness to one’s 
attention being captured by any element of the clutter presented to one (for why otherwise would one 
be looking). Purposeful looking, in contrast, lacks such openness and the clutter remains 
undifferentiated, at least so long as the looked-for element is not among the clutter looked-over. Still, 
in both cases, as Crowther notes, the attendant difference in phenomenology need not correspond to 
a difference in the properties represented by or presented in the experience. But from the point of 
view of an exploration of the perceptual apprehension of absence (viz. the apprehension of the presence 
of the absence of something at some place or an absential location), this is suggestive. For consider: 
if a change in phenomenology can occur without a change in the properties presented, a change in 
phenomenology can occur even in the absence of the presence of any properties to mark that 
difference. In the case of absence perception, I am proposing that the relevant difference pertains to 
the configuration of phenomenal experience: Sartre perceives the café – a phenomenal plenitude – merely 
as a ground – that is as an undifferentiated neutrality - as a result of his looking for Pierre at that place. 
But, if so, this explains why there can, after all, be ‘something it’s like’ to perceive the absence of 
something somewhere. ‘What it’s like’ flows from the way experience is configured as a result of the 
perceiver’s activity at place, where that activity is part of a larger action that has itself a calculative 
order. Importantly, this position is consistent with a non-attitudinal treatment of the ontology of absences. 
It can be granted that absences are ways the world is. Nonetheless, it is insisted that what Sartre 
perceives is not an absence, but an absential location, the bounds of which are circumscribed attitudinally 
– by reference to Sartre’s interests and intentions. Sartre intended to meet his friend at the café.  
 
 
§4. The Sartrean insight rehabilitated 
 
I have proposed that Sartre treats perceptual experience as having certain configurational 
features – it involves the presentation of a figure on a ground. And I have suggested that this makes 
sense of Sartre’s supposition that one can perceive nothingness; thoughts lack such a configuration. But, 
as such, this involves a denial that experience is transparent without remainder - there is more to the 
phenomenology of experience than is given only by the objects, properties and relations that one’s 
experience is of. Echoing Sartre, “no one object, no group of objects is especially designed to be 
organized as specifically either ground or figure”.  But this makes plain why there is ‘something it’s 
like’ to perceptually apprehend absence without there being any thing present to ground that 
phenomenology. The relevant difference is configurational (or here ‘ab-figurative’, see fn. vi). 
This insight is, I contend, Sartrean in spirit if not to the letter. What’s more, it is explanatorily 
productive. Take the circles below. Taylor (1952) supposes that just as one directly and non-
inferentially perceives the presence of the dot in the left-hand circle below, one directly and non-
inferentially perceives the absence of the dot in the circle on the right. Molnar (2000) disagrees. There 
is nothing to ground the inference as to the dot’s presence in the left-hand case, for one simply sees 
it, but in the right-hand case “there is something from which we can infer the circle’s being empty of 




The Sartrean account can steer a conciliatory path between these two. 
In line with Martin, the circle on the right is absent of a dot and this is just a matter of how 
the world – there is an absence of a dot at that region. Hence, in seeing the region one sees a region 
at which it is true that a dot is absent there and this is so without one necessarily seeing that a dot is absent. 
So, with Taylor, we can allow that one’s experience of the region does not involve inference. Like 
O’Shaughnessy’s letter it involves, not a failure of experience, but a positive perceptual experience of 
a blank, white expanse. With Molnar however, we can acknowledge that such an experience is not one 
that represents, or is of the dot’s absence, for what one apprehends is simply an absential location. 
Even so, the phenomenological datum is that one apprehends the absence of the dot. So, need it be the 
case that one thereby infers, as Molnar urges, the absence of a dot? That is, need it be the case that one 
merely ‘perceives’, in O’Shaughnessy’s attenuated sense, the absence of the dot? Again, the Sartrean 
picture suggests an alternative.  
When one perceives the circle on the right, one perceives an absential location – a place which 
it is true that there is no dot. But when the circle on the right is presented alongside the circle on the 
left, as it is in the stimulus, then arguably the white expanse in the circle on the right is apt to strike 
one in a certain way. The way it is apt to strike one is, I propose, as merely a ground, one that, in Sartrean 
idiom, is apprehended as ‘nihilated’, the “nihilation of which summons and demands the appearance 
of the figure”.xvii Importantly, this apprehension is perceptual, not cognitive, because of its configuration. 
What more, we can easily imagine an explanatory role for perceptual activity in making sense of this 
apprehension.  
Though one can see both circles at a glance, arguably the scene is parsed in such a way that 
one can attend to the differences between the circles.xviii  This case, however, is not like that of Sartre, 
whose intention to meet his friend for a coffee explains what he is doing in the café. Instead, low-level 
implicit expectations are likely to govern explanatorily relevant patterns of perceptual activity. The 
treatment of absence perception set out by Farennikova (2013) helps make sense of this.xix   
For Farennikova, visual perceptions of absences (in an unreconstructed sense) are best 
explained by what she calls a mismatch model. This is spelt out as follows: When something is 
expected at some place, the visual system, subject to cues, activates visual templates of entities 
predicted to be at that place or in that environment. For example, seeing a kitchen (the cue) activates 
visual templates of items predicted to be found there, a fridge say. Such templates are then projected 
and ‘matched’ against incoming sensory input. Where a discrepancy occurs, a predictive error is 
registered and “resolved as a mismatch between the predicted state of the world and what is actually 
observed”.xx The proposal is that absence perception involves ‘mismatch’ in this sense. It involves the 
violation of expectation in failed visual searches - that is, those that fail to find their target - while the 
‘expectation’ that is violated involves the cued ‘projection’ of visual templates at a scene. 
Such a view differs from the picture this paper draws along two dimensions. First, it appeals 
to the nature of the visual template involved in mismatch to explain the visual nature of seeing absence 
- the visual template is of the sort conserved and manipulated in visual working memory. As such, the 
account appeals to the nature of the representations involved in generating mismatch. In contrast, the 
Sartrean account sketched here appeals instead to the nature of perceptual experience – not its 
phenomenal nature, but rather the fact that perceptual experience is configured or shaped by interests 
and intentions, where this has consequences for perceptual phenomenology. Second, it is argued by 
Farennikova that absences are seen. The proposal made here is weaker – one only perceives absential 
locations the bounds of which are circumscribed by reference to attitudes and intentions.  
Despite these differences however, the mismatch model remains rich and suggestive. In 
particular, what the mismatch model teaches is that the boundaries of absential locations can 
sometimes be circumscribed implicitly - with respect to cue-based visual processing in one individual 
at some place, where this processing notably subserves visual searches.xxi But this, I propose, suggests 
a way of accommodating the missing dot.  
Suppose a visual template of a dot is cued by one’s perceptual apprehension of the circle on 
the left. The seeing of the white expanse in the circle on the right as merely a ground may be partly 
explained by the mechanism of mismatch. The seeing of the circle cues the template and the seeing 
of the expanse yields mismatch. Still, if the view sketched here is correct, what explains the perceptual 
nature of the apprehension is the seeing of a ground without a figure, and this is so even if it is 
nonetheless allowed that the mismatch model, or something like it, can help capture and explain a 
distinct but related feature of this phenomenology, one that I have so far left untheorised.  
As I have been insisting, in absence perception one sees merely a ground, where this in 
turn explains why there is ‘something it’s like’ to perceive the absence of something at some place, the 
puzzle with which I opened. For Sartre, however, the mere seeing of the ground has a peculiar 
phenomenology; one apprehends a “flickering” of nothingness, where the nihilation of the ground 
“summons and demands the appearance of the figure”. Elsewhere he writes: 
 
“Pierre’s absence haunts the café and is the condition of its self-nihilating 
organization as ground”.xxii 
 
The mismatch model suggests the resources to account for this metaphorically cast 
phenomenological ‘flicker’ or haunting character, supposing that visual templates can somehow 
pervade phenomenology. In this paper, however, I have only sought to explain only what Sartre 
perceives. I have argued that Sartre perceives an absential location the bounds of which are 
circumscribed by reference to Sartre’s interests and intentions, with consequences for his perceptual 
phenomenology.  What Sartre perceives are, as O’Shaughnessy puts it, phenomenal realities – mirrors, 
rattling saucers, waiters - that are configured in a certain way, where the way they are configured is 
explained by what Sartre is intentionally doing at that place – looking for Pierre.xxiii And this explains, 
finally, why there is ‘something it is like’ for Sartre to perceive Pierre’s absence. What Sartre perceives 
is a café-sized absential location the bounds of which are circumscribed attitudinally and which, despite 
its teeming positivity – those cups and rattling saucers - is apprehended by Sartre merely as a ground, 
one which Pierre, to give Sartre the last word, haunts. 
 
 
i Richard M. Gale, ‘Negation and Non-being’ American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 10 (London: William Clowes & 
Sons, 1976) 
ii See Soteriou (2011) for a distinction between weak and strong formulations of the transparency thesis – strong 
formulations insist that experience is transparent without remainder. Matthew Soteriou, ‘The Perception of Absence, Space 
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